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1. Introduction
The informal economy is defined as economic activities related to the 
production and trade of goods and services that are not registered or 
are conducted by unregistered entities; such activities operate outside 
of government regulation and tax systems (Webb et al., 2013). Accor-
ding to Schneider (2002), more than 50% of the gross domestic pro-
duct of emerging economies is connected to the informal economy. 
Becoming an important area of study. Indeed, researchers who stu-
dy informality in Latin American countries and Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia agree that companies must now address two types of 
competitors, both formal and informal (McCann & Bahl, 2016, Men-
di & Costamagna, 2017). Because they avoid the costs associated with 
regulatory compliance and tax payments, informal competitors enjoy 
relative cost advantages that allow them to undervalue their products. 
As a result, they may remain in the market despite their low produc-
tivity (Farrell, 2004; Perry et al., 2007).
However, the influence of the informal economy on strategic manage-
ment within the formal economy remains unexplored (Webb, Ireland, 
& Ketchen, 2014). Different studies consider informal competition as 
a relevant factor in the competitive dynamics of industries in emer-
ging economies and on formal enterprises. In this sense, Iriyama, Kis-
hore & Talukdar (2016) found in IT industry in India, that informal 
competition increases the non-market competitive corruption activi-
ties of formal enterprises, which aim to reduce the benefits that infor-
mal enterprises derive from their lower costs in terms of money and 
time. Additionally, Mendi & Costamagna (2017) found that informal 
competition has a negative effect on innovation types (process and 
product). These relationships were tested with data from the World 
Bank taken from a sample of African and Latin American countries. 
These results are relevant because the study of informal activity can 
yield important insights in areas such as the boundaries of the firm, 
diversification, dynamic capabilities, the resource-based view, pro-
perty rights, disruptive technology, and innovation (McGahan, 2012).
Given the importance of informal competition, it is essential to ex-
plore the effects of this phenomenon on the innovation capacity of 
Latin American companies and analyze how informal competition’s 
interaction with institutional factors affects innovation, and which 
strategies companies can use to mitigate the effects of informal com-
petition on innovation performance (Grazzi & Pitrobelli, 2016; Webb 
et al., 2014). For both the theory and the practice of strategic proces-
ses, it is important to analyze how Latin America’s particular condi-
tions interrelate and influence the enterprises’ innovation performan-
ce (Mendi & Costamagna, 2017). In the same vein, other arguments 
highlighting the need to analyze the relationship between informal 
competition and innovative performance are that no theory has at-
tempted to explain the effect of quality of governance on the informal 
competition among, and the innovation performance of companies 
in emerging economies. In particular, the effect of quality of gover-
nance on strategic processes such as innovation has been ignored 
(Becheikh, Landry & Amara, 2006). Moreover, the factors behind 
innovation performance in emerging economies are underexplored, 
as most studies have been conducted in developed countries, where 
conditions are different from those of emerging economies (Grazzi & 
Pitrobelli, 2016).
The purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of informal com-
petition on innovation performance, taking the case of the countries 
belonging to the Pacific Alliance (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) 
as representative of Latin American and emerging economies. These 
relationships are evaluated with Casual Mediation Analysis (Hicks & 
Tingley, 2011), and previous evaluations of the proposed theoretical 
model with Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) (Hair et al., 2010; 
Hoyle, 2012). The data are from 3,268 manufacturing firms from the 
“World Bank Enterprise Survey” (2010). To build the theoretical mo-
del between informal competition and innovation performance, we 
draw from the strategy tripod which argues that the management of 
innovation might be based not only on the firm’s ability to enhance 
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its internal resources and capabilities, as in the resource-based view, 
but also on industry (informal competition) and institutional effect 
(Peng et al., 2008). Thus, the impact of informal competition on key 
issues such as innovation is an unexplored field, the study of which 
may lead to promising new conceptual frameworks, thus furthering 
our understanding of how Latin America’s specific environment in-
fluences the sustainability of its companies’ competitive advantages. 
Against this backdrop, we propose the following research questions: 
a) Does informal competition affect the innovativeness of companies 
in the Pacific Alliance? If so, how does it affect them? And b) How 
do the quality of governance, market labor rigidities and informal 
competition interact? In sum, this study presents a theoretical model 
for empirical validation that explains how the quality of governance, 
market labor rigidities and informal competition simultaneously, and 
directly or indirectly, influence the innovation performance of com-
panies in emerging economies, generating theoretical and managerial 
implications.
In the next sections, we discuss the literature including the strategy 
tripod approach as the theoretical approach, the effects of quality of 
governance and market labor rigidities on innovation performance 
through informal competition and the influence of informal compe-
tition on innovation performance. Next, the method is explained and 
data. Then, the results are discussed in the context of emerging eco-
nomies. We conclude with our findings, implications for managers 
and policymakers.
2. Conceptual background, theoretical model and hypothesis
In emerging economies, the strategy tripod proposed by Peng et al., 
(2008) refers to institutional, industry and firm factors (resources 
and strategic capabilities) that are complementary and relevant to 
explaining strategic behavior and business performance. In this stu-
dy, the strategy tripod approach is applied to the study of factors 
affecting the innovation performance of firms in emerging econo-
mies. Specifically, the strategy tripod approach gives the theoretical 
framework to identify and analyze external factors (institutional) 
affecting innovation performance of the firm. In this case, it is se-
lected two categories following the Borrmann, Busse & Neuhaus 
(2006) division of institutional factors: the quality of governance 
and labor rigidities. In the following sections, it is argued and stated 
the effect of the selected external factors in innovation performance 
and their hypothesis. These assumptions are shown in the theore-
tical proposed model (Figure 1). Basically, the model explains how 
external factors affect the innovation performance and the media-
ting role of informal competition.
Figure 1. Theoretical model.
2.1. The influence of informal competition on innovation performance
Most studies of innovation performance have been conducted in 
developed economies, where the external and internal factors that 
influence innovation performance have been previously identified 
(Becheikh et al., 2006; Geldes & Felzensztein, 2013; Geldes et al., 
2017). In particular, Latin America and many developing countries 
are characterized by a unique environment that experiences sudden 
changes in economic volatility and significant increases in informal 
competition (unregistered firms) (Vassolo et al., 2011)but it also faces 
serious challenges that severely underscore these opportunities. We 
apply a simple framework of analysis to describe the Latin American 
business environment and detect research opportunities. For that, we 
focus on four aspects of the region: (1. However, no study has inves-
tigated the impact of informal competition (unregistered firms) on 
innovative performance in Latin America (Webb et al., 2014). Our 
aim in this article is to better understand the conditions under which 
informal competition (unregistered firms) affect innovation perfor-
mance through the indirect effect of quality of governance. Current 
measures of innovation performance can be roughly divided into 
two categories: input measures and output measures. Input measu-
res evaluate how innovation activities have been arranged and how 
resources are allocated to them. Output measures evaluate the effects 
of successful innovations  (Becheikh et al., 2006). We define the in-
novative performance construct according to Becheikh et al., (2006) 
and consider the following as inputs: research and development, and 
purchases of licenses to use intellectual property. As outputs, we con-
sider sales of new/significantly improved products. 
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2017. Volume 12, Issue 4
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://jotmi.org)
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios. 24
2.2. The indirect effect of the quality of governance on innovation 
performance mediated by informal competition
In relation to the quality of governance, formal innovative industries 
find their performance negatively impacted by regulation, i.e., taxes 
or bribery, when interacting with the government (Grazzi & Pitrobe-
lli, 2016). Moreover, excessive regulations are the main reason for the 
existence of a large informal sector, which chooses to operate infor-
mally to avoid the costs, time demands, and procedures imposed by 
the formal regulatory environment (De Soto, 2000). In addition, stu-
dies have shown that when government regulations were effectively 
enforced, the percentage of firms affected by informal competition 
increased (Tokman, 1978). 
To measure the quality of governance, Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 
(2009) propose six dimensions: political instability, voice and accou-
ntability, corruption control, the rule of law, government effective-
ness and regulatory quality. Low institutional quality, represented by 
increases in corruption and insecurity and by excessive regulation 
informal competition in emerging economies (Tokman, 2001). The 
interconnection between institutions and the informal sector may be 
partially explained by the country’s institutional setting, and, conver-
sely, the presence of an informal sector may affect institutional effi-
ciency (Mendi & Costamagna, 2017). This informal competition ne-
gatively influences formal companies’ ability to innovate in sluggish 
emerging economies, which have low barriers to entry and plentiful 
opportunities for imitation due to the lack of protection of intellectual 
property, as well as the lower competitive advantage (Allred & Park, 
2007; Godfrey, 2011). Additionally, if the Intellectual Property Right 
(IPR) are weak and ineffective (Allred & Park, 2007) discourages ma-
nufacturing firms from filing for new patents related to their innova-
tions (Allred & Park, 2007). Given the weakness of Latin America’s 
IPR system, this factor is especially relevant in our Latin American 
context (Barros, 2015; Grazzi & Pietrobelli, 2016). With these back-
grounds, it is proposed the following hypothesis:
H1: The quality of governance indirectly influences companies’ abi-
lities to innovate when there is informal competition in emerging 
economies.
H1A: The quality of governance is positively related to informal com-
petition in emerging economies.
H1B: The informal competition is negatively related to innovation 
performance in emerging economies.
2.2.The indirect effect of market labor rigidities on innovation 
performance mediated by informal competition
The second category of institutional factors that are considered in this 
study is that of labor rigidities (regulations). Labor rigidities, accor-
ding to Borrmann et al., (2006), including paying taxes, obtaining 
credits and managing licenses. In addition, Thai & Turkina, (2014) 
enrich the category of labor rigidities by including supply factors (re-
sources and abilities) as a category that contains both labor regula-
tions and human development. Excessive use of the regulations (e.g., 
labor market rigidities) and procedures for business development 
provided by institutions influence the increase in the number of in-
formal businesses (Webb et al., 2014) in emerging economies A poor 
support system, represented by a high level of labor rigidity and lack 
of qualified personnel, increases informal competition in companies 
in emerging economies (Ketchen, Ireland & Webb, 2014). Further-
more, formal and informal firms compete for the same customers and 
resources (McGahan, 2012). The resulting informal competition re-
duces firms’ innovation performance by means of imitation.
H2: Market labor rigidities indirectly influence the innovation per-
formance of formal enterprises through informal competition.
H2A: Market labor rigidities increases informal competition in emer-
ging economies.
3. Data and Method
In the following section, it is described the data, the case of study and 
the method.
3.1. Data and case of study
To test the hypotheses, it is employed the 2010 “World Bank Enter-
prise Survey”. The surveys provide information on the companies’ 
characteristics, strategies, and economic performance, as well as their 
perceptions of the institutional, policy, and economic environment 
and the degree of competition in which they operate. The Enterprise 
Survey data have been featured in a number of previously published 
studies in the field of informal competition (Iriyama et al., 2016; Mc-
cann & Bahl, 2016; Mendi & Costamagna, 2017).
The case of study are the countries of the Pacific Alliance a trade ini-
tiative, namely Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. This selection is 
a response to a diverse range of issues. The group of countries hosts 
38% of the population of Latin America and 34% of its GDP. Moreo-
ver, the group already accounts for half of intraregional trade, 50% of 
regional trade with Asia and 42% of foreign direct investment in Latin 
America. Chile and México have shown strong economic growth over 
the past ten years, with growth rates between 6% and 8% (Illescas 
& Jaramillo, 2011), high export volumes and the implementation of 
trade liberalization policies that foster international trade. Although 
Peru has not been considered in the previous studies we examined, 
it was included in our sample because, in recent years, Peru has also 
experienced a rapid increase in its exports of goods and services as 
a percentage of GDP. During the period 2005–2010, Peru had a me-
dian growth rate of 5.5% of its GDP (Illescas & Jaramillo, 2011; Peña-
Vinces et al., 2017). According to with World Bank Enterprise Survey 
(2010), the economy percent of firms competing against unregistered 
or informal firms for each country are Chile (55.8), Colombia (70.9), 
Mexico (70.3), and Peru (68,6). 
The data, corrected for outliers and missing values, included inter-
views at 3,268 manufacturing firms in the year 2010. The Enterprise 
Surveys collect data from key manufacturing and service sectors and 
employ a standardized format and uniform sampling methodology to 
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minimize measurement error and make the data comparable across 
countries. We focus on manufacturing industries because they have 
the imperative to continually invest in innovation and are more con-
sistent in their reporting procedures for innovation investment compa-
red with other industrial categories such as services or non-profits (All-
red & Park, 2007). Moreover, innovation is relatively more important 
in manufacturing and services industries, where value added originates 
and knowledge and skills are more valued (Crespi & Zuniga, 2012)
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, and Uruguay.  Additionally, the 
determinants of innovations and the effects of the different types of in-
novation are specific to each economic sector (Geldes et al., 2017).
3.2 Method
The method follows the guidelines of Structural Equation Modelling 
(SEM). The latent variables and the theoretical model are built with 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analy-
sis (CFA), with SEM the hypotheses are tested (Hoyle, 2012). Table 1 
provides a detailed summary of indicators for each latent variable: (i) 
Labor Support, (ii) Quality of governance and (iii) Innovation perfor-
mance. The remaining variable, the mediator Informal Competition, 
is considered observable (continuous). 
Table 1: Summary of variables and constructs. 




Ordinal (0-4) How much of an obstacle: tax administrations Borrmann, Busse, & Neuhaus 
(2006); Kaufman, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi (2009); Thai & 
Turkina (2014); Zhu, Witt-
mann, & Peng, (2012).
Ordinal (0-4) How much of an obstacle: tax rates
Quality of governance
Ordinal (0-4) How much of an obstacle: corruption
Ordinal (0-4) How much of an obstacle: political instability
Dependent 
variable Innovation performance
Continuous In the fiscal year 2009: how much was spent on purchases of licenses to use intellectual property?
(Becheikh et al., 2006)Continuous In the fiscal year 2009: how much was spent on R&D activities per-formed within this establishment?
Continuous In the fiscal year 2009: how much was earned through sales of new/sig-nificantly improved products (introduced in the past 3 years)? 
Mediator 
variable Informal Competition Ordinal (1-5)
How big the obstacle is: business practices of competitors in the infor-
mal sector?
Mendi & Costamagna (2017) 
Iriyama et al., (2016) (Mccann 
& Bahl, 2016)
Additionally, in Table 2 are the tests of latent variables for i) reliability (Cronbach´s alpha > 0.7; Construct reliability - CR > 0.7), ii) Convergent validity (Standardized 
factor loading - FL >0.5; Average variance extracted - AVE > 0.5) and iii) Discriminant validity (AVE > MSV - Maximum shared variance squared; AVE > ASV - 
Average variance shared square) (Hair et al., 2010). 
Table 2: Test of latent variables.
Constructs and items
  Reliability Convergent validity Discriminant validity
FL Cronbach´s alpha CR AVE ASV MSV
Quality of governance   0.84 0.80 0.67 0.12 0.64
How much of an obstacle: crime, theft, and disorder? 0.82          
How much of an obstacle: political instability? 0.88    
Market Labor rigidity and regulations   0.81 0.70 0.54 0.11 0.64
    How much of an obstacle: tax administrations? 0.85          
    How much of an obstacle: tax rates 0.80          
Informal competition
Innovation capabilities   0.83 0.54 0.28 0.01 0.01
  In 2009 fiscal year:  how much was spent on purchases 
of licenses to use intellectual property? 0.78          
  In 2009 fiscal year:  how much was spent on R&D 
activities performed within this establishment? 0.81      
  performed within this establishment?       
  In 2009 fiscal year:  sales new/significantly improved 
products (introduced last 3 years)? 0.78      
To evaluate the theoretical model and SEM are used indicators for “minimum” and “good” fit of the model accordingly to CMIN/df (2<x<3; x<2); NFI (x>0.90; 
x>0.95); CFI (x>0.95; x>0.99); RMSEA (2<x<3; x<2) (Hair et al., 2010). Moreover, with the purpose of analysis, the possible mediation of informal competition in the 
relationship between a dynamic environment and Innovation performance, it is estimated the total effects and its decomposition indirect effect and indirect effect. 
It involves two steps. First, two regression models are fitted, one in which the mediator is regressed on the exposure variable, adjusted for covariates, and a second in 
which the outcome is regressed on the exposure and mediator variable, adjusted for covariates. Predictions from these models are then used within a Monte-Carlo 
framework to calculate estimates for total, indirect and direct effects (Hicks & Tingley, 2011; Cheong & MacKinnon, 2012).
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4. Results and Discussion
The Figure 2 shows that all the correlation between the variables in SEM 
model is statistically significative, with the exception on the relation bet-
ween market labor rigidities and innovative performance. Moreover, the 
SEM has a good level of fit and the latent variables accomplish with all re-
quirements, with the exception of market labor rigidities with low levels 
of convergent validity. This last point can be explained due to nature of 
secondary data. Additionally, in relation to the hypotheses, it is stated the 
H1A is no rejected meaning that the quality of governance is positively 
related to informal competition in emerging economies with a correla-
tion of 0.12. In the second term, the H1B is no rejected too. It is mean that 
the informal competition is negatively related to innovation performance 
in emerging economies (-0.24). In the case of H2A, it is no rejected, then 
market labor rigidities are related to informal competition (0.24). Moreo-
ver, there is a significative and positive relationship between the quality of 
governance and the market labor rigidities (0.63). 
Figure 2. SEM. 
(***99%, **95% statistical significance)
In relation to H1 “The quality of governance indirectly influences 
companies’ abilities to innovate when there is informal competition 
in emerging economies” and H2 “Market labor rigidities indirectly 
influence the innovation performance of formal enterprises through 
informal competition”, both hypotheses are not rejected, demonstra-
ting the mediation role of informal competition. Table 3 shows the 
indirect effect in both cases and they represent 45% and 67% of effect 
mediated. These results are relevant for the competitive strategy of 
firms in emerging economies. The governments of emerging cou-
ntries, such as those of the Pacific Alliance, have initiated national 
programs to support innovation and increase spending on innova-
tion, with the goal of helping companies improve their competitive 
advantage in the global environment (Ketelhöhn & Ogliastri, 2013). 
However, the innovative performance of Latin American countries 
is still low (Olavarrieta & Villena, 2014). Our empirical analyses first 
demonstrated that informal competition has a negative effect on the 
innovation performance of formal firms. Formal firms change their 
behavior due to informal competition (unregistered firms), which 
capture returns from the formal firms’ innovative efforts by copying. 
Therefore, formal firms invest less in innovation. Our findings rein-
force a quantitative study by Mendi & Costamagna, (2017) which 
used data from the World Bank of African and Latin American cou-
ntries and found that informal competition has a negative effect on 
innovation types (process and product). In addition, similar evidence 
is found in the Chinese market, in which informal competition affects 
firm investment in R&D (Su, Xie, & Peng, 2010). 
Table 3: Mediation analysis. Total Effect and Indirect Effect.
Variables Total effect Direct effect
Indirect 
effect
% effect  
mediated
Quality of 
governance 0,07 0,10 -0,03 45%
Market labor 
rigidities -0,09 -0,03 -0,06 67%
5. Conclusions, implications and limitations
The governments of emerging countries intend to support innovation 
with the goal of helping firms to improve their competitive advantage 
in the global environment. However, our empirical analyses demons-
trated that informal competition has a negative effect on the innovation 
performance of formal firms. These firms change their behavior due to 
informal competition (unregistered firms), which capture returns from 
the formal firms’ innovative efforts by copying. Therefore, formal firms 
invest less in innovation and governments’ goals are not achieved. It 
is clear that firms do not progress on their foundations of competitive 
behavior. However, the negative effect of informal competition is not 
uniform across companies in different industries, for example, high ba-
rriers to entry and high fixed costs act as natural barriers to informal 
competition. More research on competitive actions to reduce the im-
pact of informal competition is necessary to identify the right approach 
to help formal firms to thrive in unfriendly competitive landscapes.
5.1. Implications
These results have theoretical and practical implications. From a 
theoretical point of view, informal competition is a new variable that 
should be included in the study of innovative performance and strate-
gic behavior in emerging economies, along with quality of governan-
ce and labor market rigidities. 
From a practical point of view, managers in charge should not over-
look the influence of informal competition. Our work confirms that 
informal competition negatively affects the innovative performance 
of formal firms. Such competition requires companies to implement 
activities that allow the configuration of their innovation capabilities. 
These activities may include investing in technology to differentiate 
themselves and to maintain competitive advantage in environments 
of informal competition. 
5.2.- Limitations
There are some limitations of our study. First, the secondary sour-
ces of information we have used shed light on only one construct of 
innovation performance. Therefore, future research should consider 
the development and validation of new quantitative scales to assess 
model robustness (Becheikh et al., 2006). 
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Second, this study is context-specific, as it focuses solely on Pacific 
Alliance (i.e., Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) firms. Owing to 
the great differences between the Pacific Alliance and other emerging 
economies, the generalizability of our conclusions may be limited. 
Therefore, applicability to other emerging economies must be valida-
ted. However, this limitation leads to a series of new research oppor-
tunities to investigate our model in other countries and contexts, such 
as China or other Latin American countries.
Finally, the cross-sectional nature of research into a dynamic concept 
enables analysis of the organizations’ situations at only one specific 
point in time rather than their overall conduct over a period of time. 
Future research should consider performing evaluations using panel 
data analysis.
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